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Western military forces are increasingly 
involved in peacemaking and peacekeeping 
roles, typically as elements of multinational 
coalitions, working alongside non-
governmental organisations that have very 
diff erent remits. Cultural diff erences amongst 
allies have caused problems in previous 
confl icts, for example in Bosnia. In addition, 
lack of awareness of the cultural values of 
indigenous populations, for example in Iraq, 
has led to resentment and open hostility. 
Knowledge of important cultural diff erences, 
and of their implications, is therefore vital 
for the avoidance of misunderstandings and 
friction amongst allies, and for the reduction 
of hostility amongst the host populations.
What do we mean by ‘culture’? Geert 
Hofstede’s 1984 defi nition of culture is a 
useful working basis:
Culture is “the collective programming of the 
mind which distinguishes the members of one 
human group from another… includes systems of 
values; and values are among the building blocks 
of culture.”
… where (cultural) values are experienced as 
a tendency to prefer certain states of aff airs 
over others. Culture is acquired unconsciously, 
therefore most people are not fully aware of 
their own culture. As a result, they tend to 
view the diff ering preferences and behaviours 
of people of other cultures as signs of 
unreliability, dishonesty, untrustworthiness or 
impoliteness, i.e. they risk viewing members 
of other cultures as they would view the less 
respectable members of their own culture.
Culture clearly infl uences the performances 
of individuals, teams and organisations, but 
it also aff ects the design of technical systems, 
which typically incorporate the unconscious 
cultural assumptions of their designers; for 
example, organisations and systems designed 
by and for ‘low power distance’ Anglo users 
tend to perform far less well for ‘high power 
distance’ Eastern users (see later description 
of power distance). Hofstede stated that 
there are three broad perspectives on 
culture: individual, collective and universal. 
Individuals’ culture are largely shaped by 
the collective cultures they are exposed to. 
Individuals are exposed to their national 
(or ethnic) culture from birth, and later in 
life are exposed to particular organisational 
and professional cultures, dependent on 
their chosen career paths. National culture 
tends to be the most strongly implanted, and 
even highly trained professionals may revert 
towards it if placed under severe stress.
In order to take account of culture in the 
performance of systems that incorporate 
humans, it is necessary to develop cultural 
yard-sticks against which individuals, 
organisations and systems can be measured 
and compared. Researchers have identifi ed a 
range of cultural factors (also called cultural 
dimensions or cultural attributes) that 
capture some of the diff erences between 
people. For example, Hofstede carried out 
a major investigation across IBM sites in 
many countries and initially identifi ed four 
cultural factors: individualism vs collectivism 
(IDV); power distance (PDI); masculinity 
vs femininity (MAS); and uncertainty 
avoidance (UAI). By measuring the positions 
of individuals and groups on a 0-100 scale 
for each of the above four factors, Hofstede 
placed them, and each nation, at a unique 
location on a ‘cultural map’. 
One of the above cultural factors, PDI, is 
about the relationships between subordinates 
and superiors. In low power distance 
organisations, there is a low concentration 
of authority. Decisions are likely to be made 
by those with appropriate knowledge and 
experience, irrespective of roles. Superior 
offi  cers rely on experience and on lower 
ranking personnel, and lower ranks expect 
to be consulted. Decisions can be questioned 
and overridden in particular circumstances. 
In high power distance organisations, there is 
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a high concentration of authority. Decisions 
are made by those in authority based on their 
roles in the organisation, and are dispatched 
downwards through the organisation. Lower 
ranks expect to be told; decisions are rarely 
questioned and never overridden in any 
circumstances. High power distance has been 
found to be a major contributing factor in 
transport and military aircraft accidents.
Th e research work described in this article 
captures the cultural traits of individuals and 
systems, and relates these to military mission 
requirements. Th erefore, a set of cultural 
factors has been chosen that refl ects the 
concerns of Western military organisations 
(see below).
To demonstrate the feasibility of the 
research, a software tool, the Soft Factors 
Modelling Tool (SFMT) has been built 
and evaluated. Th e purpose of the SFMT 
is to enable mission planners to evaluate a 
set of resources (comprising human and, 
potentially, technical components) that they 
have brought together to carry out a mission 
in a particular environment. Th e SFMT tool 
could be utilised in order to answer a question 
such as the following:
“Is the selected confi guration of military assets 
capable of demonstrating appropriate decision-
making, communication and adaptive skills and 
behaviour in an operational environment where 
the command style is control-free, authority is 
delegated, operational tempo is unpredictable 
and the battlespace is ill-defi ned?”
In order to evaluate a set of ‘agents’ (decision-
makers) against mission (or operational 
environment) requirements, the SFMT 
enables you to (i) describe up to three agents 
(e.g. a section of twelve privates that is 
assessed as a group, their section leader and 
the company HQ) in terms of their cultural 
factor scores, (ii) defi ne a mission or situation 
in terms of its environment characteristics 
and (iii) defi ne the (agent) behaviours or 
capabilities that are required for the mission. 
Th e environment characteristics are described 
by weighting 35 predefi ned characteristics; 
the behaviours are defi ned by weighting 41 
behaviour characteristics. After these details 
have been entered, the SFMT compares the 
agents’ scores against a set of ‘ideal’ scores for 
the mission, and highlights mismatches using 
a traffi  c light system. Users can then examine 
the summary and 
detailed results, and 
identify any cultural 
traits that are 
problematical.
To date, the SFMT 
has been evaluated 
in a range of military 
situations for which 
a large amount of 
information on 
personnel, events 
and outcomes has 
been available; the 
SFMT scores have 
largely been aligned 
to known outcomes, 
both positive and 
negative. It is important to note that the 
SFMT only considers cultural factors; other 
major factors such as wide disparities in 
numbers of personnel, training, weaponry 
or military intelligence are not taken into 
account.
Th e SFMT has also been applied in 
sporting and industrial scenarios, where it 
has highlighted issues that were recognised 
by personnel who were familiar with those 
scenarios.
Th e work on the SFMT has demonstrated 
that it is feasible to build a simple to use tool 
that can assess the mismatch between human 
agents and missions, and also between human 
agents and technical systems. However, no 
claim is made that this tool is a panacea 
in its present form, as signifi cant further 
development and evaluation work is still 
required. ?
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